The Mixed Success of the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is a vital judicial body of the United Nations. Its purpose is to settle disputes between states, often concerning territorial issues. It provides a peaceful and unbiased legal means to reach an agreement, and, by doing so, it aims to prevent war between states. However, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty leaves gaps in the enforcement of the rulings, putting into question the ICJ’s authority and effectiveness. Despite its mixed success, it carries significant symbolic power; its decisions hold political weight regardless of enforcement. Eighty years on, reform, but not abolishment, may be in order.

The ICJ was created in 1945 to provide a legal framework for resolving international disputes before they escalate to armed conflicts. This is a body to promote and help establish the UN’s goals of peace and global cooperation. Its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands, are staffed by fifteen international judges, each of them serving a nine-year term. The selection of these judges is a meticulous and long process, ending with an absolute majority approval from the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. This ensures the candidate receives full support from the states over which the Court presides, thereby reinforcing the power of its rulings.

In theory, the ICJ's authority and rulings are to be respected by all UN Member States, as it was created by the UN to ensure an effective and impartial process in resolving global conflicts. Article 94(1) of the UN Charter clearly states an agreement of compliance:

‘1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.’

The Charter further authorises the Security Council to take measures to enforce the rulings of the ICJ on the occasion that a Member State refuses to comply in Article 94(2):

'2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.' 

A key phrase in the Article above is “if it deems necessary”; there is no requirement for the UNSC to act, and therefore its response to states that refuse to comply with the ICJ rulings has historically been very inconsistent. For example, in 2018, the ICJ ordered the U.S. to lift certain sanctions against Iran based on the 1955 Treaty of Amity. When the United States did not comply, Iran could have triggered Article 94 and brought it before the UNSC, but it did not. This was likely due to the structure of the UNSC, where the United States, being a permanent member, had veto power and could nullify the resolution. This shows a significant procedural weakness; the ICJ’s rulings cannot always be enforced, despite what the UN charter sets out. Enforcement is limited by the compliance of the UNSC and therefore allows for permanent members and their allies to overrule the judgement – not in law but in practice. Ultimately, the power structure of the UNSC allows for an imbalance in enforcement thereby weakening the judgements handed down by the ICJ.

With the UNSC's conditional enforcement and the absence of any other international body stepping in to perform the role, the ICJ must rely on the parties to respect its decisions and act accordingly. The ICJ largely depends on the voluntary cooperation of states and, in some cases, this works well. For instance, in Cameroon v. Nigeria (2002), the ICJ successfully resolved a long-standing border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula. Cameroon brought the case to the Court in 1994 after multiple border incidents made it evident that, without an agreement, the dispute would escalate to an expensive war and destabilise the region. The ICJ provided a suitable platform for the settlement of this conflict due to its standing in both States’ explicit declarations accepting its jurisdiction as compulsory. The Court's decision, which awarded the peninsula to Cameroon, led to a peace agreement between the two countries and the eventual withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the region. This successful resolution shows the ability of the ICJ to resolve conflicts and create peaceful solutions. However, it also demonstrates its heavy reliance on States’ respect for its decisions, as well as its lengthy, years-long processes.

When respected, the ICJ's judgments and opinions can shape international relations by providing a legal basis for various issues, not just military conflicts. For example, in the Whaling in the Antarctic case (Australia v. Japan, 2014), the Court's ruling against Japan's whaling practices affected global environmental policies and reinforced international norms regarding the conservation of marine life. This ruling was impactful as these two states are deeply committed to the ICJ framework and international law. This is due to both nations being strong participants in the international community, actively advocating that states abide by the international rule of law. Therefore, a rejection of the ruling would be hypocritical and they would suffer condemnation and distrust from the international community. Additionally, Japan and Australia are significant trading partners, so an unresolved legal dispute would be economically harmful for both nations and thus encourages compliance.  Similarly, the ICJ's ruling in the Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile, 2014) helped resolve a long-standing maritime boundary dispute between the states. The decision provided a clear legal framework for both states, and the maritime border was recognised internationally. Such peaceful resolutions demonstrate the success of the ICJ when voluntarily respected.

International pressure can also influence states to comply with the verdict because of concerns about reputation and the desire to be seen as law-abiding members of the global community. An example of this is Nicaragua v. United States of America (1985), brought by the former to dispute the United States’ military and paramilitary activities in Nicaraguan territory. The United States was supporting paramilitary groups which were fighting Nicaragua's government, and in doing so, conducted mining and other activities without the permission of the government of Nicaragua. The ICJ ruled in Nicaragua’s favour, deeming the United States' activity in the country illegal and demanding its withdrawal and reparations. Initially, the United States disputed the claim and refused to comply with the ruling. However, due to the overwhelming vote of the General Assembly condemning the United States' actions, especially from its allies, and continuous international pressure, it eventually ceased the aggressive operations in the country – although still refusing reparations. 

Ultimately, international pressure was able to partially enforce the ICJ’s rulings, underlining the weight and influence of nations’ standing within the international community. Actors are more likely to establish cooperation with nations that have a reputation for following international law to protect the security of agreements and ensure follow-through. In the above instance, even the U.S. could be pressured to abide by international law (although partially), while Nicaragua's case brought significant fame and respect to the state as it was seen as law-abiding. It was praised in the international community for not taking a military approach to resolve the matter, and by challenging such a global superpower in the international court. Nicaragua, despite not receiving all that was awarded in the court ruling, gained diplomatic support internationally, showcasing the court’s influence. 

Overall, the ICJ continues to hold prestige and respect today for its long history of resolving international disputes and conflicts peacefully. However, its flaws persist due to the influence of state sovereignty. Additionally, the lack of enforcement by the UN Security Council or a dedicated body on behalf of the ICJ allows states to ignore the rulings. The ICJ has proven to be successful, but its effectiveness relies heavily on voluntary self-enforcement. This shortcoming holds it back from achieving its purpose universally and calls for reform.